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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we investigate the issues involved in the deregulation of an electricity market. The 
paper focuses on efficiency considerations, comparing the gap between the socially efficient 
outcome and that achievable by a market. We model this problem with two-sided uncertainty: the 
uncertain market demand and the uncertain cost of production. In each case, we find the social 
optimum and the equilibrium outcome of the deregulated market. Conditions when deregulated 
industry cannot generate the socially optimal number of firms are identified. The relationship 
between market demand, the degree of risk-aversion of private firms, and the equilibrium number 
of firms is investigated. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
hortly after the deregulation of its electricity market, Ontario experienced shortage of power and soaring 
electricity prices in the summer of 2002. There has been a huge debate on the issue of deregulation of the 
power industry. Most economists support the idea of liberalization, as it will enhance market efficiency 
and allocate market resources in a better way. However, the implementation of a restructured electricity market has 
not been a smooth process in most pioneer countries. 
 
The causes of the power crisis are many, from both the demand side and the supply side of the market. The 
demand for electricity is volatile and hard to predict because of unpredictable weather conditions and the variability 
in the speed of economic growth. Moreover, the retail price of electricity to most residential customers and small 
business is not on an hourly basis, but rather on a monthly average rate. The hourly price of electricity is a piece of 
hidden information to those consumers. The supply of electric power, due to the capacity constraint of the 
generation plants, is known to be very inelastic to price changes (Borenstein 2002). So there are fundamental 
difficulties in pricing and supplying electric power efficiently. 
 
The supply of power, from the generating companies to the end users, is composed of three parts: 
generation, transmission and distribution. The transmission part has the properties of a natural monopoly, and 
remains regulated in the restructuring process in Ontario
1
. The distribution market has been partly
 
opened to 
competition, but still under price regulation. Power generation and the wholesale electricity
 
market have been 
deregulated and opened to competition since May 2002. 
 
Given these characteristics of the electricity market, we develop a model where demand is fluctuating and 
unpredictable. Both the social optimum outcome and the market equilibrium are affected by this structure, and the 
prevailing belief that market equilibrium always generates less than the socially efficient number of firms is not 
necessarily true under fluctuating market demand. When market equilibrium does generate less firms than the social 
optimum, the higher the mean level of market demand, the larger the welfare gap between the social optimum and 
market equilibrium. In a market that firms can enter freely but facing uncertain demand, high expected market 
demand will bring in more competitors and thus the total output will increase. However the firms won’t operate at 
the most efficient level of production. We show that the loss from the added fixed costs outweighs the gain from the 
intensified competition. 
S 
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Besides the random shocks to market demand, the fixed cost of power generation is hard to predict too. A 
nuclear power plant needs to wait for two to five years in order to get operating permission from the regulatory 
agencies. During this period the owners must pay financing costs without a clear sense of completion date. In the 
second part of this paper, we add this feature into the model, i.e. allowing uncertainties from both demand and 
supply side of the market. We compare the social optimum outcome with the market equilibrium when firms are 
risk-neutral, and when firms are risk-averse. With risk-neutral firms, the condition is determined when market 
equilibrium cannot generate the social optimum number of firms. With risk-averse firms, we find the relationship 
between the degree of risk-aversion of private firms and the market equilibrium number of firms under different 
phase of the demand. This extended model shows some important features of the market equilibrium. When the 
expected market demand is strong, despite their risk aversion firms are more willing to enter the market and 
compete. When the expected market demand is weak, however, risk-averse firms would tend to shy away from the 
market. In practice, since existing firms have occupied the majority of the market, entering firms are essentially 
going to compete for the residual demand. Residual demand is highly uncertain and volatile as it is affected by both 
market demand uncertainty and the existing firms’ supply uncertainty. Thus new potential competitors are extremely 
cautious to enter the market. 
 
The results of this paper have strong implications for public policy. Soaring wholesale prices and 
unplanned power outage (black-out) happened in both California and Ontario after the deregulation of electricity 
market. As a result, both states incurred loss of billions of dollars and had to hold back their steps towards a 
competitive electricity market. This paper shows that when there is uncertainty in demand and in the cost of private 
firms, regulatory agencies should not take it for granted that private sector will build new power plants under the 
deregulated system. To reach the desired sufficiency of power supply under deregulation, there has to be some way 
through which private investors could insure against the uncertainty. 
 
Paul Joskow (2008) gives a thorough overview of the status of electricity market liberalization. Lessens are 
learned from the experiences in electricity restructuring in England and Wales, the Nordic countries, Argentina, 
Australia, California, and Ontario. He points out that system reliability is of great concern to policymakers in almost 
every country. Even relatively short blackouts carry high political (if not economic) costs. However, agreement has 
not been reached among economists on whether or how competitive power markets can stimulate levels of 
investment in new generating capacity in the right places at the right time. In the U.S., over 220,000 MW of new 
generating capacity went into service between 1999 and 2006. In England and Wales about 40% of the stock of 
generation plants in service was replaced with modern efficient combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technology 
between 1990 and 2002. Other countries, including Argentina, Chile, and Australia, also attracted significant new 
generating capacity after the market reforms were initiated. 
 
However, in places like Ontario, California, and New Zealand, great concerns have been expressed about 
incentive for private investment in additional generating capacity. According to Trebilcock and Hrab (2005), only 
two new private-generation projects amounting to 620 MW became operational during the first year of the open 
market in Ontario, while almost all existing generation capacity will be retired from service or require substantial 
refurbishment over the next 30 years. 
 
Iacobucci, et al. (2006) suggests the following elements (among others) to be essential for the transition 
from monopoly provision to competitive markets: significant generation market restructuring to encourage entry; 
sufficient transmission and generation capacity to deal with exogenous (demand) shocks; and integration of larger 
regional markets (e.g. Quebec, Manitoba, Ontario, and the North-east of the U.S.) to even out fluctuations in local 
demand and supply. 
 
A Brief History 
 
In order to understand Ontario’s road to power deregulation, let us first look at the market demand and 
generation capacity since the 1980’s. 
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Figure 1: Annual Peak Demand 1984-2002 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the peak market demand in Ontario from year 1984 to 2002
2
.  Figure 2 shows the peak 
demand in each month of 2008
3
. From these figures we can observe the fluctuation in peak demand from year to 
year, and the seasonal fluctuation within a year. 
 
As part of the introduction of a new electricity market, Ontario Power Generation (OPG) is to decontrol
4 
a 
portion of its electricity generation, so that OPG would represent no more than 35% of the provinces
 
electricity 
supply 10 years after the market opens (Iacobucci, et al. 2006). This decontrol
 
will result in substantial competition 
and customer choice. 
 
OPG’s first decontrol transaction is the long-term lease of the Bruce nuclear stations to Bruce Power, which 
is 80% owned by British Energy. Cameco has a 15% ownership in Bruce Power, and the other 5% of the equity is 
held by the two major employee unions at the Bruce stations. In May 2002, OPG completed the sale to Great Lakes 
Hydro Income Fund of four hydroelectric generating stations and related water storage facilities located on the 
Mississagi River, east of Sault Ste. Marie in Northern Ontario, for the price of $340 million. In year 2007, OPG 
owns about 75% of the 30,662 MW installed generation capacity in Ontario. 
 
Before the 1980’s, generation of electricity was a state-owned industry, possessing huge market power. 
Most cities were served by a few large stations. Since the 1980’s, the emergence of combined cycle gas turbines 
(CCGT) has allowed the production of electricity more efficient and on a much smaller scale than the traditional 
coal-fired plants. As noted in Gillen and Wen (2000), estimates of the cost of gas-powered generation lie between 4 
and 4.5 cents/kWh. Unit costs of producing electricity with nuclear-based and thermal-based generation are about 
5.1 cents/kWh and 6.7 cents/kWh respectively. CCGT plants also face less environmental objections. As CCGT 
became the preferred new source of power, competitive generation of electricity became possible. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – February 2012 Volume 10, Number 2 
114 © 2012 The Clute Institute 
 
Figure 2: Monthly Peak Demand in 2008 
 
 
The Ontario government’s plan for power supply was based on the expectation that the private sector 
would build new plants under a deregulated system. But prices soared after the electricity market opened in May 
2002, then the government shut down the experiment after only six months. In December 2002, Ontario Energy 
Board capped the retail price of electricity at 4.3 cents/kWh for residential and small business customers. With 
market reform on hold, the private sector has withdrawn many of its investment plans. Ontario’s tight capacity 
became a focus of attention when the power system failed in Ontario and seven U.S. states in Mid-August of 2003. 
 
A wide array of issues holds back private investment in power generation in Ontario. The uncertain future 
of electricity deregulation is only one of them. There are problems with the market perspective of building new gas-
fired power plants, as well as major uncertainties about the future competitive landscape in the province. In Ontario, 
hydro-electricity has largely been tapped to its maximum potential, and it is difficult to get approval to build new 
coal or nuclear plants. Private companies like TransAlta find it hard to forecast Ontario’s electricity supply for the 
future, because there is significant uncertainty about the province’s nuclear plants. Once those dormant nuclear units 
are restarted, the price of electricity may go down; therefore the profitability of investing in new gas-fired plants has 
been questioned by most private companies. Apparently, in Ontario the major deterrence to investing in power 
generation is not the incumbents’ predatory behaviour, but the fluctuation in market demand and in the cost of 
production. Deregulation can lead to an inefficient number of firms in the market equilibrium. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models the problem of power generation with 
market demand uncertainty, and compares the market equilibrium outcome with the social optimum. In section 3, 
we relax the assumption of constant fixed cost, and study the model with uncertainty from both demand and supply 
sides of the market. Section 4 concludes. 
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2  TWO STATES OF DEMAND AND CONSTANT FIXED COST 
 
In this section, we model the electricity market with a random demand function, and see how the 
fluctuation in demand affects the equilibrium outcome. We first look at the ideal supply situation, i.e. the social 
optimum. Then we investigate the market equilibrium with and without free entry conditions. 
 
2.1  Social Optimum 
 
Suppose there are n generation plants in the market, producing identical products. All plants are symmetric 
with cost function given by
5 
 
                                         (1) 
 
F is the fixed cost of production.   is a random shock to the fixed cost. We assume   = 0 in this section; the 
situation     (uncertain fixed cost) will be examined in Section 3. 
 
There are random shocks to the market demand curve. The inverse market demand function is given by 
 
                                               (2) 
 
when demand is high; or 
 
                                               (3) 
 
when demand is low, where      , b > 0. Assume demand is low with probability p and high with probability 
1 − p. 
 
The social optimum (first-best outcome) is obtained by maximizing consumer surplus net of producers’ 
costs, by choosing the optimal number of plants and output level. Here it does not matter if the social planner sets 
price equal to marginal cost or average cost of production, since price only determines who get the larger share of 
the total surplus, producers or consumers. 
 
We all know that social surplus is maximized where marginal willingness to pay equals marginal cost, i.e. 
at the intersection of the demand curve and the marginal cost curve. This is the first best outcome when the social 
planner has perfect information about the cost function and the market demand function. However, when demand is 
random and the social planner has no ability to perfectly forecast (due to unexpected weather conditions, for 
example), the optimization problem takes a different form. 
 
Let  be the total surplus when demand is high and  be the total surplus when demand is low. The social 
planner’s optimization problem becomes, 
 
                     
 
by choosing q, the amount of total output, and n, the number of generation plants. Here            
 
 
; 
           
 
 
.        is the total cost of production, when n plants are in the market. Given that all plants 
have the same cost functions, the social planner will split the total output equally to each plant (Viscusi, et al.  
2000). Therefore, 
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If there is only one plant in the market, the most efficient level of production occurs where MC (q) = AC (q), i.e. 
       . When there are two plants in the market, the most efficient level of production occurs at   
      
     .6 
 
Optimal n under Discrete Choices of Quantity 
 
Suppose the set of quantities to choose from is composed only of the most efficient levels of production, 
i.e.                     , then the social planner’s choice variables are reduced to one.7 As long as the optimal 
number of generation plants is determined, the output level will be   multiplied by that number. 
The social planner’s optimization problem now takes the form of 
 
                                       
   
 
   
 
 
 
by choosing n. 
 
First order condition gives the optimal value of n, 
 
   
                    
    
 
 
Substitute in         and let               , the expression can be simplified to 
 
   
           
 
                                      (4) 
 
The second order condition is satisfied for a maximum. Given that n has to be an integer, we will compare 
the two integers that are adjacent to n
*
. In general, we compare the social welfare levels at      and     ,8 and 
determine the optimal number of plants. To simplify notations, we will continue using n
*
 as the benchmark for the 
following analysis. 
 
2.2  Market Equilibrium 
 
Now we investigate the market equilibrium under two circumstances. First we look at the equilibrium with 
fixed number of firms and then we allow free entry by firms and compare the equilibrium outcome with social 
optimum. 
 
2.2.1  Fixed Number of Firms 
 
As noted in Ventosa et al. (2005), most studies on the imperfect competition in electricity market are based 
on Cournot competition, in which firms compete in optimal output. We adopt this assumption here as well. In the 
real world, all generating companies bid in price and conditions of availability in the power pool. However, the 
assumption that firms engage in Cournot competition is justified by the fact that every power plant has capacity 
constraint. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) offers an elegant theoretical support for this idea. 
 
Suppose there are n
*
 plants operating in the market. They compete in their quantities of production. The 
price is determined by the market demand curve. Assume firms are risk neutral. Each firm i chooses its own quantity 
   to 
                                  
 
where      
  
   . 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – February 2012 Volume 10, Number 2 
© 2012 The Clute Institute  117 
The Cournot outcome follows. 
  
      
    
          
 
 
           
 
 
           
  
      
          
 
 
         
       
          
 
 
         
       
          
 
 
It is obvious that   
      is less than the most efficient level of production        , and the total output 
level is also less than the social optimum. These results are not surprising. Cournot outcome only approaches the 
results of perfect competition when n gets large. 
 
2.2.2  Free Entry 
 
Now we will investigate the market equilibrium with free entry and find out the equilibrium number of 
firms in the market. Assume that firms are symmetric in the sense that they all face the entry problem. There are no 
incumbents in the market. 
 
Consider the following 3-stage game: in the first stage, firms simultaneously determine whether to enter the 
market and pay the fixed cost F if entry occurs;
9
 in the second stage, firms that had entered the market compete in 
their quantities of production; in the last stage, the actual market demand is realized and price is determined by the 
demand curve. 
 
There are pure strategy subgame perfect equilibriums for this game, where firms keep entering the market 
until the expected profit for entering equals zero.
10 
 
Applying the results from “Fixed Number of Firms” (Section 2.2.1), a private firm’s expected profit from 
the subgame after entry is 
 
      
    
         
 
 
        
 
Set E[ ] equal to zero, we will get the equilibrium number of firms in the market. 
 
   
    
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
                                                 (5) 
 
Consequently, the market equilibrium prices are 
 
                  
 
   
                              (6) 
 
                       
 
   
                   (7) 
 
where       is the fluctuation in market price. 
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Comparing    with the social optimum   , we get the following result. 
 
Proposition 1:       if and only if the following condition holds, 
 
     
    
 
           
 
 
 
or in terms of p, 
 
    
 
   
                                            (8) 
 
This proposition tells us that market equilibrium (with free entry condition) generates less than socially 
optimal number of firms, as long as fixed cost is beyond a certain point, or the probability of having low demand is 
higher than a certain value. 
 
Suppose condition (8) is satisfied. We know that market equilibrium cannot replicate the social optimum 
outcome. The question is how the welfare gap varies with the uncertainty in market demand.  Next we will calculate 
the total welfare level at the social optimum and at the market equilibrium, and then find out the relationship 
between the difference in welfare and the uncertainty in demand. Let Wsp be the maximized value of the social 
planner’s total surplus. Let Wm be the surplus from the market equilibrium with free entry. 
 
Proposition 2: The gap between Wsp and Wm is a decreasing function of p (probability of low demand). 
 
Proof: 
 
From the social planner’s optimization problem, we can get 
 
       
    
 
                           
    
 
        
 
Substitute in the values of    and   , the above expression can be simplified to 
 
    
       
  
 
     
 
     
   
 
                                            (9) 
 
From the market equilibrium, we can get 
 
       
      
 
                          
      
 
    
          
 
Substitute in the values of    and   
     , the above expression can be simplified to 
 
   
       
  
       
  
 
     
 
   
 
        
       
                      (10) 
 
Subtract equation (10) from (9), 
 
            
  
 
  
    
    
      
   
 
 
        
       
                (11) 
 
The difference between Wsp and Wm is an increasing function of E(a), since 
    
    
    . 
             , is decreasing in p. Therefore the gap between Wsp and Wm is a decreasing function of p. 
Q.E.D. 
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When E(a) increases, i.e. the average level of market demand increases, the loss of total welfare from the 
market equilibrium increases as well. One might argue that when market demand is high, the competition among 
private firms becomes intense. It is true. In the market equilibrium with free entry, both the number of firms and the 
total output level increase in E(a), which helps to reduce the welfare gap between the social optimum and the market 
equilibrium. However, none of the private firms operate at the most efficient level of production. From the social 
planner’s point of view, the private investors overreact to market signals by too much entry. The positive effect from 
intense competition is overrun by the negative effect from the added fixed costs of production. Overall the welfare 
gap will increase.
11 
 
3  TWO STATES OF DEMAND AND RANDOM FIXED COST 
 
Waiting for approval from the environmental authorities adds great uncertainty to the fixed cost of power 
generation for both nuclear and fossil-fuelled power plants. In addition, the construction costs are also volatile and 
unpredictable. As an example, when returning to service in September 2003, the refurbished first unit at Pickering A 
nuclear power station was more than two years behind schedule and $800 million over budget.  
 
In the previous section, we assumed that  , the random shock to fixed cost, equals zero. Now we will 
change this assumption to a uniformly distributed   in the range of [0, F/2]. Let      and      be the CDF and 
PDF of   respectively. For a uniformed distributed variable,         ,          . The unconditional 
expectation of   is F/4. Assume   and p are independently distributed. 
 
We will first look at the social optimum outcome under uncertainties, both to the market demand and to the 
fixed costs of production. 
 
3.1  The Social Optimum 
 
A risk-neutral social planner will choose n to 
 
               
   
 
                
Note that the only difference between this optimization problem and the social optimum from Section 2 is this term: 
      . 
 
Let    
  be the optimal solution, we can get 
 
   
  
             
 
                               (12) 
 
Next we will look at the market equilibrium with risk-neutral firms and with risk-averse firms.
12 
 
3.2  Market Equilibrium with Risk Neutral Firms 
 
A risk-neutral private firm chooses its quantity of production to 
 
                                 
            
   
 
 
 
The Cournot outcome gives 
   
    
         
 
 
Substitute the optimal level of production
13
 into the objective function and set that equal to zero. We can get the 
equilibrium number of firms with free entry, denoted by     , 
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                                    (13) 
 
Comparing      with the social optimum    
 , we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 3:    
       if the following conditions hold, 
 
    , and        
    
     
                
 
, or in terms of p,  
 
      
 
   
        
 
      
 
 
      
 
Recall that without random shock to fixed costs,   is the minimum level of p above which market equilibrium 
generates less than socially efficient number of firms. The expression of   is given in equation (8). Comparing the 
values of     and  , we get 
      
  
   
  
  
 
        
 
 
    
 
This value is always positive; in other words,      . With the random shock   to fixed costs, market 
equilibrium generates less than socially optimum number of firms for a wider range of p. In other words, when 
taking into account of the uncertain fixed cost, the number of firms in the market equilibrium is even less likely to 
be the social optimum. 
 
3.3  Market Equilibrium with Risk Averse Firms 
 
Now suppose private firms are risk averse. They are still expected utility maximizers, but their utility 
functions have to be concave in the profit levels. Their objective functions will now take the following form, 
 
          
where      .14 In order for this problem to have valid mathematical meanings, we confine the value of   to the 
reciprocal of odd numbers, i.e.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   .15 
 
In our particular case, the objective function of each private firm can be written as 
 
                    
       
 
                    
              
   
 
 
 
By solving the maximization problem and using the zero-profit condition, we get the following result. 
 
Proposition 4: When private firms are risk-averse, the market equilibrium number of firms ( ) and the degree of 
risk-aversion ( ) satisfy the following relationship: when    
 
 
   ,   is increasing in  ; when      
 
 
 ,   is 
decreasing in  .  
 
Proof: 
 
First order condition of the private firm’s optimization problem yields 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
   
    
   
             
                            (14) 
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where                 ;                 . 
 
Equation (14) defines the optimal    as a function of n. We know that under free-entry condition, the expected profit 
of each firm is zero,
16
 which means 
         
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
        
or equivalently, 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                              (15) 
 
Substitute equation (14) into (15), we have the following condition: 
 
  
   
                  
   
 
   
 
   
                     (16) 
 
The left hand side of equation (16) is increasing in   (given   is relatively small). The right hand side can 
be decreasing or increasing in  , depending on the value of p. 
 
Given   being the reciprocal of an odd number, the right hand side of equation (16) can be transformed to  
 
  
 
   
 
   
, the derivative of which with respect to   is then  
 
   
 
   
    
 
   
 . 
 
When     
 
 
, i.e.   
 
   
  , the R.H.S. of (16) is an decreasing function of  . When 
 
 
    , i.e. 
 
   
  ,  
 
it is an increasing function of  . Combined with the result that the L.H.S. of (16) increases in  , our proposition 
follows immediately. Q.E.D. 
 
Intuitively, when the market demand is on average high, i.e. p is less than a half, the more risk-averse the 
private firms are, the higher the number of firms entering the market in equilibrium. When the demand is on average 
low, i.e. p is greater than a half, the more risk-averse the private firms are, the lower the number of firms entering 
the market in equilibrium. In other words, the expected market demand directly affects risk-averse firms’ attitude 
towards risk in entry. The second scenario explains why there has been lack of private investment in Ontario since 
the market was opened in 2002. From the viewpoint of private investors, the demand they face will be the difference 
between the market demand and the supply from OPG’s existing power plants. This residual demand is even more 
volatile as it is affected by both demand uncertainty and other firms’ supply uncertainty. When expecting the 
residual demand being low, either due to slowing down of economic growth or restarting of OPG’s dormant nuclear 
plants, risk-averse private investors tend to shy away from this market.   
 
Solving for   from the equilibrium conditions is quite complicated and has little analytical meaning. Thus 
we do not compare market equilibrium with the social optimum for risk-averse private firms here. 
 
4  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we evaluate the performance of deregulated power generation industry, under the assumptions 
of random demand and random fixed costs.  We find that the fluctuation in demand affects not only the social 
planner’s optimal choice, but also the relative performance of market equilibrium. When there is random shock to 
fixed costs, entry behaviour of potential firms is further deterred. For risk-averse private firms, the degree of risk-
aversion also affects entry and the performance of market equilibrium.  The intention of this paper is not to answer 
the question whether the power generation industry should be opened to competition. Allowing for private 
investment in power generation is a common practice nowadays. However, the deregulated industry has not done a 
good job in adding more capacity to the power pool. This paper explains the underlying reason from both demand 
and supply sides of the market. 
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The results of this paper can be applied to the question of how a social planner should set the ratio between 
nuclear and gas-turbine power plants. Nuclear power is associated with high fixed cost and low variable cost. Gas-
turbine generation plants cost much less to construct, but the input price is high. The ideal solution is to let nuclear 
power fulfill the regular demand, and to let gas-turbine power generation fill the gap between high and low demand. 
Our model can also be applied to the problems resulted from asymmetric information. Incomplete information 
regarding the fluctuations in construction costs along with the complicated process of getting regulatory approval 
can deter interested parties from entering the market. Social welfare would be improved if asymmetric information 
can be reduced. 
 
Zareipour, et al. (2007) examines the operation of Ontario’s competitive electricity market, including 
several programs introduced by the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) to improve electricity market 
stability and efficiency. Among these programs, the Spare Generation On-line program (SGOL) and the Market 
Power Mitigation Agreement (MPMA) are directly related to the supply side of the market. 
 
The SGOL program launched in August 2003 was mainly designed to improve market reliability by 
offering eligible generators a guarantee of their start-up costs. While this objective has been met, market efficiency 
has been reduced by the payment of more than $33 million to eligible generators. MPMA was put in place by the 
Ontario government before opening the market in May 2002. Effective April 2005, generation from OPG’s base 
load hydroelectric and nuclear facilities was capped at $33/MWh and $49.5/MWh respectively. OPG’s revenue from 
its unregulated assets, i.e. non-base load hydroelectric, coal and gas-fired stations, were capped at $47/MWh. The 
Market Surveillance Panel so far has not found any exercise of market power by OPG or any other market 
participants. However, as pointed out in Zareipour et al (2007), the MPMA resulted in inefficient operation of OPG 
and subsidized electricity prices for consumers. 
 
The Ontario Power Authority has also been negotiating contracts with both supply and demand sides to 
ensure availability of reliable power. Given these contracts and new capped prices over most of OPG’s output, only 
about 25% of the total Ontario generation capacity is truly open to market competition. 
 
The tradeoff between market efficiency and system reliability seems hard to avoid in the short-run of 
electricity market deregulation. Overtime, investment in additional capacity should be made as long as the 
incremental value of the investment exceeds the incremental cost of the investment. As vividly described in Dewees 
(2001), over time competitive prices in a market in which new investment is not small relative to installed capacity 
may follow a sawtooth pattern, rising until a new plant comes on line, then falling, only to rise again as demand 
grows. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. For readers interested in the reform of transmission networks, Littlechild (2008) offers a good survey on the 
challenges faced by policymakers and private investors in transmission expansions and interconnection. 
2. Data source: http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/marketReports/10Year_ODF_2004jan_20030526.pdf 
3. Data source: http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/marketdata/marketSummary.asp 
4. “Decontrol” means selling, leasing, or swapping generation, or using other mechanisms that result in 
yielding control over operations and power marketing to others. 
5. We assume quadratic cost function for the reasons that it captures the main characteristics of electricity 
supply and allows for potential competitiveness in theory (Borenstein 2002; Viscusi, et al. 2000). 
6. The social planner will divide the total output equally between the two plants, therefore the average cost 
curve is obtained by doubling the output level at each average cost level. 
7. For an optimization problem where the social planner chooses both the number of plants and the output 
level, optimal output level is proved to be    multiplied by the number of plants. So even though we 
confine the social planner’s choice variable to one, the results are the same as in a multi-variable 
optimization problem. 
8.      is the smallest integer that is greater than or equal to   .      is the largest integer that is less than or 
equal to   . 
9. F can be explained as construction costs. 
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10. Mixed strategy equilibrium also exists. For example, all potential entrants enter the market with probability 
 , and stay out of the market with probability 1 −  . 
11. Comparative static analysis shows Wsp is not monotonic in E(a). Neither is Wm monotonic in E(a). 
Moreover, the conditions under which Wsp increases in E(a) don’t imply that Wm increases or decreases in 
E(a). So it is not true assuming that the increase in welfare gap is merely a result of the expansion in the 
market size. 
12. We investigate the two types of firms separately, because closed form results can be obtained in the model 
with risk-neutral firms, but not with risk-averse firms. The model with risk-averse firms is appealing and 
can serve as the foundation of future research. 
13. For risk-neutral firms, the expressions of qi are the same with or without the random shock to fixed costs. 
14. We can think of risk-neutral firms as having   equal to 1. The closer is the value of   to 1, the less risk-
averse private firms are; the closer is the value of   to 0, the more risk-averse they are. 
15. Free entry condition ensures that sometimes profits are negative, and the square root of a negative number 
does not exist. As only the trend in   matters in the analysis that follows, this assumption on   is 
legitimate. 
16. One can as well set the expected utility       equal to zero. The main results are not affected. 
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